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National Rifle Association
vs
House of Representatives and Public Opinion:
A Case Study in Interest Group Power
by
Doug Goodman

Single-issue interest groups can be a concern in the United States. At times they represent
the interest of a minority of the population. The National Rifle Association is one such group.
The NRA opposes any type of gun-control legislation, even if the legislation is supponed by a
majority of the population. In September 1988, the House of Representatives defeated a popular
guncontrol amendment to the Omnibus-drug Bill. At the time the House defeated this amendment,
public opinion was strongly in favor of it. This paper is a case study of the power of interest
groups. Specifically, the topic is how the National Rifle Association's powerful lobbying effons
against the Brady amendment caused its defeat.
NRA vs. the House of Representatives and
Public Opinion
The two major political parties in the
United States work to influence public policy.
However, they are becoming weaker and
weaker as time passes and interest groups are
filling the void. Allan Cigler and Burdett
Loomis argue: "The weakness of political
parties has helped to create a vacuum in
electoral politics since 1960, and in recent
years interest groups have moved aggressively
to fill it" (1991, 20).
In 1988, the National Rifle Association
(NRA) exerted its power in Congress. They
lobbied against a popular gun-control measure,
the Brady amendment, which was attached
to the Omnibus-drug Bill (drug bill). The
amendment would have established a mandatory seven-day waiting period before the purchase of a handgun. The National Rifle
Association's powerful lobbying efforts against
the Brady amendment caused its defeat.

Interest Groups
Mancur Olson, Jr. addresses the subject
of interest groups by saying, "group interests

and group behavior are the primary forces in
. . . political behavior." Olson continues,
"group interests rather than individual interest
seem to be the fundamental force in lawmaking" (1968, 118). This is evident not only
in the defeat of the Brady amendment, but the
defeat and passage of many bills on Capitol
Hill.
The National Rifle Association is an interest
group or pressure group. According to well
known political scientist, David B. Truman,
an interest group is:
Any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other
groups in the society for the establishment,
maintenance, or enhancement of forms of
behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes
(1955, 33).

In 1787, one of the framers of th,
Constitution of the United States, James
Madison, also defined pressure groups. He
called them factions. Madison could see the
dangers that factions or special interest groups
could have on people and governments. In
Federalist, No. 10, Madison defines factions
as:
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A number of citizens, whether amounting to a
majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse
of passion , or of interest, adverse to the nOghts
of the other dtizens, or to the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community (1987,
46, emphasis added).

National Rifle Association
In his book, Interest Groups in the
United States, Graham Wilson describes the
National Rifle Association as conceivably the
most powerful single-issue interest group in
America. The NRA has successfully stopped
"any effective gun control." Even with the
assassination attempt on President Reagan and
the assassinations of the Kennedy brothers and
Martin Luther King, there are hardly any
federal regulations controlling the purchase
or use of guns (1981, 104). The NRA is the
primary reason for the lack of effective gun
laws.
The National Rifle Association, with
its 2.8 million members, is a special interest
group or pressure group that seeks to promote
Americans' right to bear arms. According
to Wilson, roughly 25 percent of the NRA's
members do not even shoot guns. They join
because they support the right to bear arms
(1981, 105). One tactic the NRA uses well
is that they try to represent every proposed
limitation on firearms as an assault on the right
to bear arms (Cigler and Loomis 1991, 391).

Gun Control
In 1791, Americans added the Bill of
Rights to the Constitution. Included in the
Bill of Rights is the second amendment. This
amendment, some argue, guarantees the
citizens' right to bear arms. Detroit Police
Chief, William L. Hart, explains that this
amendment to the Constitution was important,
because in 1791 there were no police departments and many people had to hunt for their

own food. Today, however, police departments are in virtually every town and people
do not have to hunt for their food because of
the accessibility of grocery stores. Chief Hart
infers that because of this, there are no longer
compelling reasons to guarantee the right to
bear arms (1988, 32).
Crime rate in the United States is high.
Each year thousands of people are victims of
violent crimes resulting from handguns.
According to the Uniform Crime Reports,
since 1980, violent crime has risen by 11
incidents per 100,000 inhabitants (U.S.
Department of Justice 1990,48). During the
four years between 1985 and 1989, the
homicide rate in the United States has risen
by 10 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants.
During the same four years, there were almost
92,000 homicides, and 45 percent of those
homicides occurred with handguns (9).
Handgun usage occurs not only in homicides,
but also in assaults, robberies, and suicides.
Handgun use also injures and kills thousands
of people accidentally each year.
Charles Orasin, President of Handgun
Control, Inc., compares the United States to
other countries and shows the high homicide
numbers in the United States as compared to
other countries. He compares New York City
to London, both having a population of about
7 million people. In 1986, there were 1,582
homicides in New York City, compared to
sixty-seven in London. He also compares the
number of homicides in Chicago to the number
of homicides in Toronto, in 1985. During
that year, there were 666 homicides in Chicago
compared to sixty-one in Toronto. Orasin
continues by saying:
Data compiled from foreign nations for 1983
shows that handguns were used to murder 35
people in Japan, 8 in Great Britain, 27 in
Switzerland, 6 in Canada, 7 in Sweden, lOin
Austria, and 9,014 in America (1988, 13).
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There is a large difference between the
number of homicides in the United States and
the number in other countries. There must
be a reason for the discrepancies in cities with
the same population base. Professors Sproule
and Kennett give a partial explanation for the
high homicide rate in the United States. In
their article, they compare homicide rates in
Canada, which has strict handgun laws, to
homicide rates in the United States, which does
not have strict handgun laws. Their evidence
overwhelmingly illustrates that handgun control
does reduce homicide rates (1989, 245-51).
Defeat of the Brady Amendment
On June 30, 1988, the House Judiciary
Committee approved a controversial handgun
provision. The amendment calls for a seven-day waiting period before the purchase of a
handgun (Lawrence 1988, 1839). This
amendment is called the "'Brady amendment, '
after James S. Brady, White House press
secretary wounded in the 1981 assassination
attempt on the President" (1840).
The attachment of the Brady amendment to the drug bill concerned the NRA.
Wayne LaPierre, executive director of the
NRA's Institute for Legislative Action (ILA) ,
commented on the Brady amendment by saying
that the bill "is a maJor issue." LaPierre
added, "It's the federal government imposing
its views on the states" (1839).
Nadine Cohadas reported in an article
that the gun-lobby, mainly the National Rifle
Association and Gun Owners of America,
geared up for plans to strike the seven- day
waiting period from the drug bill (1988, 1904).
Defeating the Brady amendment was the major
priority of the NRA. The NRA would spend
millions of dollars and mobilize thousands of
faithful letter writing members to defeat the
Brady amendment. In his essay, Paul Johnson
says that the NRA has the resources to lobby
strongl y against the amendment. In 1987, the

NRA's Institute for Legislative Action--its
congressional lobyy group--spent $9.6 million
or 15 percent of the total NRA' s expenditures
(1991, 42).
The NRA uses its magazines, American
Rifleman and American Hunter, to get the
word out to its members and to start its
campaign against the Brady amendment. In
1988, the AmeriCan Rifleman, alone, claimed
a circulation of about 1.4 million readers
(National Rifle Association 1988, 95).
As part of the NRA' s strategy, in the
August 1988 issue of American Rifleman it
attacked two similar bills. The targets were
Senate bill S.466 and House bill H.R.975, also
known as the Metzenbaum/Feighan bill
(National Rifle Association 1988,56). These
two bills were the forerunners to the Brady
amendment; their content and language were
similar to that of the Brady amendment. The
attack on these two bills leaves the reader to
believe that they and the Brady amendment
are one in the same. The NRA even refers
to the Brady amendment in its magazines as
the Metzenbaum/Feighan/Brady amendment
(1988, 56).
In its articles and advertisements, the
NRA exaggerated the contents of the Brady
amendment. The NRA' s article mentioned
the Brady amendment to the drug bill, but
mingled parts of S.466 and H.R.975 with it.
The NRA reports:
Proponents of the "waiting period" provision
say states that already have "waiting periods"
or permit systems are exempt; however, the bill
would require duplication. New Yorkers who
need permission from a judge, for example
would also need permission from a local police
chiefwith a seven-day wait. S.466 and H.R.975
as introduced (unlike the Feighan amendment
to the drug bill ... ) would apply not just to
dealer transfers but also to private transfers-including gifts from parents to children-giving local
law enforcement the power to decide whether
to disapprove the transfer. These bills would
put the government in the middle of every
handgun transfer in America. And there would
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be no right of appeal, no legal redress in federal
law for arbitrary or illegal denial. (National Rit1e
Association 1988, 56)

In this article, the NRA gave the
im~~ession ~hat in addition to the seven-day
waItmg penod and background check on
potential handgun buyers, the Brady amendment would call for a waiting period on all
gun transfers and a national gun registration.
To illustrate this point, the NRA placed a full
page advertisement calling for the stop of "the
waiting period gun registration scam" (National
Rifle Association 1988, 56-7).
In 1989, the Congressional Research
Service (CRS) analyzed the NRA. The CRS
received complaints about the NRA misstating
the facts about gun-control legislation. The
NRA tried to lead gun-owners into. thinking
the government would confiscate their guns
(Biskupic 1989, 3313).
In response to the attack on the NRA' s
advertisements and articles, Wayne LaPierre
justified the NRA's actions because of the wide
scope oflegislation, proposals and amendments
each bill. faces. The NRA "collectively
charactenzes the 'types' of bills that might
come up." LaPierre continues by saying that
the NRA does not use bill numbers in its
advertisements. He also says that they make
them as accurate as they can, "given that those
bills change. And we don't know what kind
of floor amendments we have to face" (3313).
Besides the advertisements and articles
in magazines, Biskupic says that the NRA
astounds lawmakers on both sides of the
gun-control issue by mobilizing its grass-root
membership (3313). Representative William
J. Hughes (D-NJ), describes the NRA as: "A
l~bb~ that c~ put 15,000 letters in your
dlstnct overnIght and have people in your
townhall meetings interrupting you" (3313).
Ronald Hrebenar and Ruth Scott say that the
NRA can "generate a half million letters to
Congress within three days" (1990, 103).

The NRA, through its numerous
mailings, vocalized the interests of anti-gun
control advocates in congressional districts.
Ar~sas Representative Beryle Anthony, Jr.,
ChaIrman of theDemocratic Campaign
Committee, said that many members of the
House wanted to vote against the NRA but
did not because of "the unpleasantness to
which the member would be entertained back
home" (Berke 1988, A32).
. In his essay, Paul Johnson says that
dunng the fight against the Brady amendment,
the NRA more than doubled its political
expenditures (1991, 39). An article in the
New York Times, by Richard Berke, says that
the NRA out-spent the largest gun-control
lobby by more than a seven to one margin.
Berke also reports that the NRA spent nearly
$3 million to defeat the Brady amendment.
This cost included mailing three letters to each
of its 2.8 million members pleading with them
to contact their representatives and urge them
to vote against the Brady amendment (1988,
A32). This illustrates the determination the
NRA has to promote its single-interest policy
of the right to bear arms.
Michael Isikoff, a reporter for the
Washin~ton Post, reported on the letter sent
to NRA members in opposition to the Brady
amendment. In the letter, the NRA said: "If
this measure becomes law, government
bureaucrats twill spend millions and billions
of your tax dollars investigating you and other
honest citizens. '" The letter continued, saying
that those who sponsor the bill, "want the
police to visit your home before you can buy
a firearm" (1988, A2). A letter like this , no
matter how much it is exaggerated, excites
people against the legislation. In turn, they
contact their representatives speaking out
against the Brady amendment.
The NRA targeted others besides its
members in its fight against the Brady amendment. The article says that in addition to
the NRA's mailing three letters to its nearly
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3 million member organization, it also targeted
20 members of the House using radio advertisements to get their support (A2).
Richard Berke reports, in contrast to
the large amount of money spent by the NRA,
Handgun-Control, Inc. (HCI) , the main
gun-controllobby, spent $250,000 to promote
the Brady amendment. Most of the money
paid for newspaper advertisements (A32).
Furthermore, the NRA, in its magazines,
publicized news conferences and interviews
with police officers speaking out against the
Brady amendment (National Rifle Association
1988, 58). This shows a split in the weak
coalition between HCI and various police
organizations.
Ccongressional campaign contributions
can also have an effect on the way members
of Congress vote. The National Rifle Association's Political Action Committee (PAC),
called the NRA Political Victory Fund
(NRA-PVF), contributed to congressional
campaigns during 1988. The NRA reports,
11[i]n the 1988 general elections, the NRA-PVF spent an estimated $3.9 million for
communication with members, directcampaign
donations or for independent campaign
expenditures." The NRA-PVF was directly
involved with 1,360 campaigns in 1988 (1990,
1). According to Fred Wertheimer, president
of Common Cause, PACs create "an obligation
for our elected officials to serve PAC interest,
first and foremost" (1983, 43). There is no
doubt that NRA-PVF contributions influenced
some members of Congress to vote for the
NRA.
After all of the money and hours spent
by both sides of the gun-control issue, the
Brady amendment finally reached the House
floor for debate and action. Christine Lawrence reports that the Rules Committee allowed
a rule considering an amendment to the
Omnibus-drug Bill by Representative Bill
McCollum (R-FL). The amendment would
be the same one that failed in the House

Judiciary Committee in July. It would strike
the seven-day waiting period and appoint the
Attorney General to develop a system to check
for felons trying to buy handguns (1988,
2290).
The Washington Post reports that the
McCollum amendment split the Democratic
leadership in the House. House Majority
Leader, Thomas Foley (D-WA), and Democratic Whip, Tony Coelho (D-CA), both
supported the amendment and voted with the
NRA (Isikoff 1988, A2). With the leadership
voting with the NRA many democrats also
favored the initiative.
On September 15, 1988, the McCollum
amendment came to the House floor for a vote.
The Con~ressional Ouarterly Weekly Rca><>rt
reported that the House adopted the McCollum
amendment 228-182 to strike the Brady
amendment and seven-day waiting period from
the Omnibus-<irug bill (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1988, 2620).
After the defeat of the Brady amendment on the floor, Cohadas reported the
following, "[Representative Edward] Feighan
and Sarah Brady sought to find a silver lining
in their defeat. " They pointed out that the vote
on the McCollum Amendment illustrates a
strong concern for background checks before
the purchase of a handgun (1988, 2565).
According to national polls, there was
more than just a strong concern for background
checks. Most of the nation favored the
seven-day waiting period at the time of the
vote. A Gallup Poll survey taken after the
defeat of the Brady amendment, shows that
at the time 91 percent of the population
favored the seven-day waiting period (Gallup
and Newport 1990, 34). This illustrates that
the members of the House of Representatives
gave in to the pressures of special interest
groups, rather then representing their constituents.
Hazel Erskine says, "It is difficult to
imagine any other issue on which Congress

Goodman 63
has been less responsive to public sentiment
for a longer period of time (1972,456). She
continues by saying that Congress has not been
a leader in gun-control or even followed public
opinion. Since the beginning of modem polls,
in 1938, no fewer than two-thirds of the
nation's population favored gun-control or
some type of supervision (455).
Though most Americans favor the
seven-day waiting period, Congress will not
pass it. Carol Greenwald describes why
Congress is afraid of passing gun-control
legislation:
II

The strength of potential electoral influence is
revealed in the gun control paradox: over
two-thirds of all Americans favor gun control
legislation, but it never passes Congress because
[of) the National Rifle Association [and) its
electoral power. "Elected officials sense that
the anticontrol voters mobilized by the gun lobby
are apt to engage in a kind of bullet voting, and
deciding their voting preferences on the basis
of the gun question alone" (1977, 63).

Along those same lines, Representative
Tom Tauke (RIA), addresses the NRA's
campaign contributions and its grass-roots
mobilizing techniques by saying, "I think a
member recognizes that a $1,000 contribution
is not going to make much of a difference in
the outcome of a political race." Tauke
continues, "But if 5 ,000 people are mobilized
in opposition, that can obviously be a threat
to re-election" (Berke 1988, A32).
Finally, the NRA used timing and the
election season to defeat the Brady amendment.
Charles Mack writes about how satisfying a
legislator's constituency is most important in
getting re-elected. However, this usually
means going along with the opinions of a few
well organized, active, and vocal groups. He
illustrates this by saying:
The public at large mayor may not share the
views of the National Rifle Association, for
instance, but it will not be a tenth as expressive

about gun control as are local gun owner (1989,
123)

With election Tuesday less that two months
away, a representative would rather not deal
with a few angry vocal constituents.
According to Graham Wilson, there
are 60 million gun owners in America. Their
votes are more of a deterrent to guncontrol
legislation than that of the NRA (1981, 105).
However, recent polls show that an overwhelming majority of gun owners favor stricter
gun-control legislation. 78 percent of those
polled favored registration (Gallup 1990,38).
It would seem to follow that most gun owners
would favor a seven day waiting period. If
the majority of the people are in favor of stricter handgun control, Congress should follow
suit.
Conclusion
At times, special interest groups
pressure Congress into making policy against
public opinion as the NRA did with the Brady
amendment. However, this policy making
under pressure from special interest groups
could be a detriment to society as Senator
Hugo Black says:
Contrary to tradition, against the public morals,
and hostile to good government, the lobby has
reached such a position of power that it threatens
government itself. It size, its power, its capacity
for evil, its greed, trickery, deception and fraud
condemn it to the death it deserves (Cigler and
Loomis 1991, 3).

Money spent by the NRA gained them
their victory. Michael Isikoff sums it up by
saying that at the defeat of the Brady amendment, the NRA re-established itself as one of
the most feared and powerful lobbies in
Washington. The NRA campaign against the
Brady amendment cost them millions of dollars
plus the nearly 10 million letters mailed
nationwide. The lobby campaign overwhelmed

I
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the coalition of gun-control advocates and
police (1988, A2). The case of the NRA
illustrates that interest groups playa major

role in formulating public policy. Sometimes,
as in this case, the policy was overwhelmingly
against public opinion.
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